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1. Introduction 
Since its inception by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1997, the constantly evolving for-
ward guidance (FG) has been introduced by a number of central banks, with the aim of en-
hancing monetary policy effectiveness at or near the zero lower bound (ZLB). This policy 
trend has been supported by solid theoretical evidence (e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, 
Nakov, 2008, Walsh, 2009). The general finding is that commitment to a future policy deci-
sions can produce expansionary effects even at ZLB. 
This being said, some identified limitations to the FG effectiveness are found to stem from 
the inherent time inconsistency, insufficient message clarity or its improper interpretation, 
deficient central bank credibility, as well as inadequate length of the commitment1 (see: 
Filardo and Hofmann, 2014, for a comprehensive documentation of forward guidance from 
both theoretical and empirical standpoints). 
The current letter provides a preliminary evidence on the FG credibility in Poland by inves-
tigating changes in the professional forecasters’ perceived ex-ante monetary policy rule, as-
sociated with introducing FG. Our empirical exercise is performed in the spirit of Mitchell 
and Pearce (2010) and Carvalho and Nechio (2014), that use microdata and consider survey 
of professional forecasters or households. These papers, however, focus on conventional 
monetary policy and abstract from FG related policy rule changes. To our knowledge this 
letter is the first insight into FG credibility using individual data on professional forecasters. 
The case of NBP is interesting as the introduction of the FG has not been accompanied by the 
ZLB. Consequently, classical monetary rule should hold till the introduction of FG. 
While the credibility issue (emphasized e.g. Bodenstein et al., 2012 and Dennis, 2014) was 
perhaps less of a concern for the monetary authorities such as Fed or ECB (although contro-
versies over its implementations and conduct can be recalled for), it was central for some 
followers, with no decades-long track of the stabilizing monetary policy and firmly anchored 
inflation expectations. The National Bank of Poland (NBP) could be regarded a good exam-
ple of an institution, for which forward guidance was a credibility test.  
                                                     
1 The longer is the time horizon applied, the more difficult it is to secure the forward guidance in-
tegrity. 
From early 1990s, NBP was first preoccupied with combating hyperinflation, pursuing mon-
ey supply targeting and stabilizing the exchange rate under crawling peg. On top of this, full 
goal and instrument independence was secured only in 1997 and headline inflation indices 
were running at double digits by the end of 1990s.  
The NBP introduced forward guidance in July 2013, less than thirteen years after bringing 
inflation rate to single digits and nine years after adopting the ongoing 2.5% inflation target. 
The FG was preceded by trimming official interest rates to historical lows, even though ZLB 
was not a policy problem at that time. Nevertheless, the construction of this tool in Poland 
was rather conservative: official interest rates were to be kept unconditionally unchanged 
over a relatively short period of six months, which was subsequently extended to one year 
and ended in June 2014. While the design of the FG was prudent, main risks were associated 
with the potential fragility of institutional credibility, which was indeed acknowledged by 
the NBP (Belka, 2014). 
2. Data 
We use individual data collected on quarterly basis under National Bank of Poland Survey of 
Professional Forecasters. The NBP-SPF dataset contains information on expectations formed 
at the end of quarter for the 4 and 8 quarters ahead horizon as well as the average annual for 
the current and next year. The forecasters are asked on their point forecasts of CPI, GDP 
growth (which here serves as a proxy for output gap) and a number of additional variables 
(including central bank’s interest rate). All the variables are expressed in annual terms. 
After omitting observations with missing interest rate forecasts, the data form unbalanced 
panel consisting of 240 observations (37 forecasters over the period from 2011 Q3 to 2014 
Q2). 
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for the full estimation sample (i.e. if all the data 
used for estimation was reported to the survey).  
  
Tab. 1 SPF descriptive statistics, 4 quarter-ahead horizon. 
Quarter 
  
CPI(t+4) ∆GDP(t+4) REPO(t+4) 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
2011Q3 2.93 0.30 2.40 3.30 3.28 0.52 2.00 3.90 4.24 0.27 3.75 4.75 
2011Q4 3.22 0.58 2.30 4.50 2.95 0.57 2.00 4.10 4.18 0.31 3.50 4.50 
2012Q1 2.89 0.50 1.70 3.80 2.65 0.49 1.90 3.40 4.27 0.22 3.90 4.50 
2012Q2 2.90 0.42 2.10 3.50 2.59 0.59 1.50 3.60 4.52 0.25 3.86 4.75 
2012Q3 2.78 0.39 2.20 3.80 2.25 0.42 1.70 3.80 4.00 0.24 3.50 4.50 
2012Q4 2.40 0.35 1.80 3.00 2.13 0.44 1.20 2.70 3.52 0.21 3.00 3.75 
2013Q1 2.02 0.30 1.20 2.50 2.25 0.44 1.60 3.30 3.16 0.16 2.75 3.38 
2013Q2 2.00 0.43 1.30 3.00 2.28 0.45 1.50 3.20 2.61 0.23 2.50 3.50 
2013Q3 1.99 0.42 1.00 2.80 2.69 0.38 2.00 3.50 2.68 0.20 2.50 3.00 
2013Q4 1.98 0.27 1.25 2.30 3.20 0.26 2.80 4.00 2.73 0.18 2.50 3.00 
2014Q1 2.03 0.26 1.50 2.50 3.41 0.39 2.70 4.30 2.69 0.18 2.50 3.10 
2014Q2 1.79 0.41 1.20 3.00 3.65 0.62 2.00 5.10 2.48 0.31 2.00 3.25 
  
Tab. 2 SPF descriptive statistics, 8 quarter-ahead horizon. 
Quarter 
  
CPI(t+8) ∆GDP(t+8) REPO(t+8) 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
2011Q3 2.72 0.30 2.10 3.20 3.51 0.37 2.80 4.00 4.12 0.39 3.60 4.87 
2011Q4 2.80 0.37 2.30 3.50 3.12 0.71 1.30 4.40 4.11 0.40 3.25 4.50 
2012Q1 2.62 0.52 1.20 3.50 3.23 0.51 2.60 4.10 4.23 0.34 3.50 4.75 
2012Q2 2.88 0.37 2.20 3.70 3.23 0.41 2.60 4.10 4.28 0.45 3.50 5.25 
2012Q3 2.82 0.29 2.40 3.60 2.88 0.60 1.60 3.80 4.10 0.35 3.50 4.50 
2012Q4 2.65 0.28 2.20 3.10 2.96 0.78 1.60 5.20 3.77 0.39 3.00 4.50 
2013Q1 2.41 0.33 1.90 3.00 2.87 0.42 2.00 3.80 3.65 0.40 3.00 4.50 
2013Q2 2.51 0.35 1.60 3.00 2.99 0.48 2.00 3.80 3.26 0.48 2.50 4.00 
2013Q3 2.50 0.30 2.00 3.20 3.27 0.43 2.40 4.00 3.49 0.44 2.75 4.08 
2013Q4 2.48 0.35 2.00 3.30 3.79 0.48 3.00 4.70 3.62 0.40 2.90 4.42 
2014Q1 2.44 0.23 2.00 3.10 3.63 0.43 2.70 4.20 3.49 0.35 2.75 4.25 
2014Q2 2.35 0.34 1.60 3.00 3.66 0.55 2.00 4.50 3.07 0.34 2.25 3.75 
  
The statistics manifest a reasonable pattern. First, some co-movement of interest rate and 
inflation is observed. This is less visible when taking the REPO and GDP. Second, during the 
FG period some decrease of dispersion across the forecasters can be observed for the four-
quarter horizon, but not for the last quarter (which might indicate that the FG exit was to 
some amount expected). 
3. Empirical model and results  
We adapt the well established Taylor (1993) rule framework for modeling conventional 
monetary policy. Much of the literature has empirically analyzed Taylor rule using macroe-
conomic data, both for the developed economies (e.g. Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 1998) as well 
emerging ones (e.g. Caraiani, 2013). At the same time, Maria-Dolores (2005), Baranowski 
(2011) and Sznajderska (2014) show that the standard Taylor rule framework is well suited to 
mimic monetary policy in Poland. Thus, the following Taylor-type equation is estimated: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡+𝑛|𝑡 = 𝑟0 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝑗,𝑡+𝑚|𝑡 + 𝜙𝑥𝑥𝑗,𝑡+𝑚|𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡 
where: 𝑟 – nominal repo rate, 𝜋 – CPI inflation, 𝑥 – GDP dynamics (proxy for output gap), j 
denotes forecasts of j-th professional forecaster, formed at time t for the [n,m=4,8] – expecta-
tions horizons. 
We therefore have two contemporaneous equations, comprising 4 and 8-quarter ahead rela-
tionships between expected interest rates and explanatory variables, and one forward-
looking equation, where the 4-quarter ahead expected interest rate is driven by forward-
looking information (i.e. further-ahead expectations of explanatory variables) 
In order to capture the effect of introducing FG, the sample is split into two subsamples: 2011 
Q3 to 2013 Q2 (non-FG) and from 2013 Q3 to 2014 Q2 (FG). We expect that in the non-FG 
period interest rate expectations are in line with the Taylor-type rule and the Taylor principle 
is satisfied. Then there are two possible scenarios for the FG period. The credible FG an-
nouncement should weaken the (perceived) reaction to inflation and output gap, while non-
credibility of the FG would be associated with unaffected perceived interest rate rule.  
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables as well as potential heteroskedasticity is addressed 
by applying GMM estimation method. The estimation results for the non-FG sample are pre-
sented in table 32: 
                                                     
2 As a robustness check we performed 2SLS estimation, where we obtained similar results (see 
Annex). Point estimates were also robust to different instrumental variable sets. 
Table 3. Estimation results – non FG period 
                       (1)             (2)             (3)    
                    REPO(t+4)        REPO(t+8)      REPO(t+4)  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
CPI(t+4)             1.506***                                 
                   (10.38)                                    
∆GDP(t+4)           -0.249                                    
                   (-1.14)                                    
CPI(t+8)                             1.300***        2.322*** 
                                    (5.37)          (7.00)    
∆GDP(t+8)                         -0.00105         -0.0672    
                                   (-0.01)         (-0.27)    
------------------------------------------------------------- 
p(Hansen)           0.289           0.131           0.239     
p(Kleibergen-Paap) 0.0000105       0.00000299      0.00000134 
N                     146             145             146    
-------------------------------------------------------------  
Notes: 
Instruments (1): CPI, ∆GDP (current-year and long-run forecasts) 
Instruments (2,3): CPI, ∆GDP (t+4, long-run forecasts) 
 
These results show that professional forecasters perceived a reasonably strong monetary 
policy response to inflation, while GDP dynamics was, in their view, not taken into account 
while setting interest rates. These results are broadly in line with empirical evidence from the 
Taylor rule estimates for Poland presented by Maria-Dolores (2005) and the inflation coeffi-
cients satisfy the Taylor principle. Moreover, the coefficients are fairly similar regardless the 
forecast horizon of explanatory variables as long as both contemporaneous relationships are 
considered (columns 1 and 2). In the forward-looking equation (column 3), the inflation coef-
ficient is higher, but GDP growth remains insignificant. Overall, these results indicate that 
the monetary policy had earned its credibility in stabilizing inflation before introducing FG. 
Results for the FG sample are presented in table 4 and offer some interesting insights. First, 
when four-quarter ahead interest rate forecast was a dependent variable (columns 1 and 3), 
neither inflation nor GDP dynamics were perceived as its significant drivers. This is exactly a 
result we expected in the credible FG scenario. Second, when forming projections for the 
eight-quarters horizon, forecasters again started to expect some impact of inflation on inter-
est rate since this horizon went beyond the announced FG period. While the Taylor principle 
is still not satisfied in this case, which might be explained by uncertainty related to the ulti-
mate length of FG, the inflation coefficient moves towards the case of non-FG perceived rule. 
Table 4. Estimation results – FG period 
                      (4)             (5)             (6)    
                   REPO(t+4)        REPO(t+8)      REPO(t+4)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
CPI(t+4)            0.161                                    
                   (0.90)                                    
∆GDP(t+4)          -0.135                                    
                  (-1.85)                                    
CPI(t+8)                            0.883**         0.379    
                                   (2.81)          (1.70)    
∆GDP(t+8)                          0.0135         -0.0557    
                                   (0.09)         (-0.67)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
p(Hansen)          0.216           0.208           0.631     
p(Kleibergen-Paap) 0.00732         0.00207         0.00207    
N                      74              75              75    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: see table 3. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Our results suggest that the FG in Poland was taken as fully credible by professional fore-
casters. While monetary policy was perceived to stabilize inflation (but not output) in the 
pre-FG period, neither inflation nor output gap developments are found to have affected 
expected interest rates during the FG period. 
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Annex: Robustness 
In the Annex we present two stage LS estimation results, for the sake of robustness with 
respect to estimation method. The instruments were set as in the baseline GMM estimation. 
 
Table A1. 2SLS estimation results – non FG period 
                   REPO(t+4)       REPO(t+8)      REPO(t+4)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
INF_4               1.498***                                 
                  (10.23)                                    
PKB_4              -0.244                                    
                  (-1.10)                                    
INF_8                            1.175***           2.082*** 
                                 (4.67)             (5.66)   
PKB_8                             0.0750            0.0805   
                                 (0.37)             (0.29)   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table A2. 2SLS estimation results – FG period 
                   REPO(t+4)       REPO(t+8)      REPO(t+4)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
CPI(t+4)            0.116                                    
                   (0.64)                                    
∆GDP(t+4)          -0.162*                                   
                  (-2.17)                                    
CPI(t+8)                            0.863**          0.326   
                                   (2.72)           (1.35)   
∆GDP(t+8)                         -0.0397           -0.0589  
                                  (-0.26)           (-0.70)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
